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I 
IN T:L·; SUPREl~ COURT OF THE 3TAT~ OF UTAH 
THE STilT~,~ OF UTA;{, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondent ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JA: .:·~3 Bo DEL,TNIS, ) 
) 
Defon,ta:rt and App0llant ) 
Case Ho. 
9920 
This is a criminal case 5. n which the 
Defendant was charged with the crime of for-
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Tha casa was tried to a Juryo From a 
verdict of Qtilty the Defendant appeals. 
R.Z1;LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
---·-------.:...=:.---
Defendant seeks r2vcrsal of the judgment 
and juugr.12nt in l1is favor as a n·,_rJ.tter of la,,-r, 
or t:~at failing, a ne"'i'l trial. 
STAT~L(ENT OF FACTS 
to tile polic3 in Provo and said that "Billi:; 
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Stu:Jbs H~s t;oing to sign a co:·.~plai nt unless 
h·~ could get the monG)' for these chocks that 
he !1ad 1:ll'i ttcn be fur·_; the bank opGned that 
mornin~~"· ~:~ ~:: He told the 1.·Jitn:;ss datecl.-i~'/'.J 
LC!)'l1nd J o l'Q}~..;r, that ll·3 had signed the name 
,, 1-
U I_ • ,l' -~ • ;~illi(; 3tubbs to the \~54. 00 elY~ ck and 
that he didn't have authority from her to sign 
t.~·J check. (Tr 15) 
The check involved is dated Decer11ber 7, 
19()2 and i~ a blank counter draft with the 
nar.10 ot B~Ja1ker Bank a!~d Trust Coo - Farmers 
and t·I8rc:1ants Brancl1 of Provo, Ut. ·' written 
in i:1k. It is payable to the order of James 
B. Donnis and is sig-ned nMrso Billie Stubbsn 
as r.ta1~..:::r. It b8ars the word "Laborn in the 
lower left hand corner. The face amount is 
,, ..... ' .·I 31 
• ,.. f • • On the face of the check in red ink 
i:·:pr2 ssed by a large rubb2r stamp is the word 
PAID Deco 11, 1962 with the large numerals 
97-lSo T?1·J check v1as endorsed on the back 
"Ja:-n.es Bo Dennis" and ncurl~y' s Market a o 
!··:8re is no evidence in ti1e r3cord to contra-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
d5ct the fact t:~at '"Then the c~L~ck was present-
e.i for pa~,:~~nt, it '1·1a:3 paid by th3 Bank on 
which it was drai:fn. (State Exo No. 1) 
Prior to 02cember 7, 1962, the Defendant 
had work~d for ~1rs. Billtc~ Stubbs. ( T~ 19) She 
paid him by. means of a c rh~' ck. She had 8i ven 
him chacLs nbut also my bookkeeper has made a 
check out for him to sign if o ( Tr 19) The Defend-
'. 
ant had written figures on a pad and "vve have 
talked it over and discussed itoj' These 
occasJ_ons arose when 11we have done a job and 
he has written a persons name on the pad and 
the figuresn (Tr 19) I•.'Irs. Stubbs tGstified 
that based on her familiarity with the writing 
of Defendant, she did not know whether the 
writing of the name of Mrs. Billie Stubbs on 
the face of the check was made"by Defendant. 
(Tr 22) 
Tl1e Defendant's attorney on page 12 of 
the Transcript asked ~trso Stubbs if it was 
not a fact t~1at she had told tli:n in a conver-
sation prior to trial that she doubted that 
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··r· D·Jnnis :1at sir:n;~d his name on t::at check. 
.. . ~ 
{tr 12) Th3 Court sustained an objaction to 
the quest]_o!1o T:1·~ DGfendant cashed the check 
at r~1tcJ. .;~rt s IIarlc;t on Dccembr;:;r 7, 1962. (1!r 8) 
H~.~ ... , :nt into the store quite oftc no The cl1~; ck 
was OK'd by the son of the Mana~ar and t~e 
Caslli·~r !~ave the Defendant the moneyo There 
is no evidence that anyone saw the Defendant 
sign the name of Hrso Billie Stubbs as r;~aker 
or the name of James Bo Dennis as endorser. 
l~o Heber Grant Ivins, Assistant District 
~~torney in his opening statement did not tell 
th~ Jury he 1,vould prove that the Defendant sign-
ed the name of Mrs. Billie Stubbs to the checko 
i!J said it was presented and endorsed by :the 
d~fendant. (Tr 4) These facts become material 
tipc:1 the question of' 1.vhether the Defendant ever 
had any intention to defraud Fonzo Do Black or 
a:1y other perso.no 
ARGUMENT 
STATEI-IENT OF POINT NUMBER ONE 
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1. The Stat8 did not present evidence 
rrurn ,J,ich a Jury could find beyond a reason-
abL: doubt that the D~;f:_;ndant had any inteil-
--
tion of defrauding anyone o 
It is signi.Cicant that the record shov1s 
that no complaint or objection to the cashing 
of this check Has. ma'd8 by I~.Irs o Billie Stubbs, 
or anyone else until Feb. 13, 1963 o The law 
r~quires the Bank upon which this check was 
drawn to know the signatures of its depositors, 
~d the presumption arises that before this 
ch8ck was cleared through Walker Bank, the 
signature of the maker was adopted or rati-
fied by Billie Stubbs. This presurnption is 
fortified by the fact that ther~ is no evi-
denc2 in the record that the signature on the 
faca of th3 check looks anything like the 
signature of 3illi3 Stubbs. The real signa-
ture is found in the record on the complaint, 
and shoi:Js affirmati v2ly that it does not 
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r;:i.:r.!bl~ the \"lriting on th·2 ch3Cko 
T:h~r; are oth2r cogent facts which show 
thJ State did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that tl1~2 Def~ndant had any fraudulent 
int2nt when h8 cashed the check at Curley's 
::ar·k,.;t. r.Jllcn IIrso Stubbs got her checks re-
turned from the Bank shortly after the first 
of January, 1963, and found the check endorsed 
by her 01:ployee James Bo Dennis, 1-1hat did she 
do? She did not have the check charged back 
by tr12 l'lalker Bank to the State Bank of Provo, 
·,·J:L!r2 it had been deposited by Curley's I.Iarket. 
s::2 r.:.1 tified the signature of her name, and 
approved of the prior action of both banks and 
Curl_;yt s I-Iarket in cashing the check bearing 
11er name signed by. some person \vi thout her 
prior authority. She did the very thing which 
James B. Dennis intended she would do when he 
cashc;d the check. She ratified the signatures 
and the cashi~g and told him to get the money 
a:li pa:r ~'ler. She gave him until Feb. 11 when 
Dennis went to the Police Department and told 
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, 
them she was going to :;ign a col!:plaint unless 
he could c~ t the money o II·! rot_~arctc~d th ~ trans-
action as a loan or advanc·.-~ o L' l:JiJ.t':e:_; .which he 
would have to pay back o i U1c 1· in la hor or money., 
The check v~as marked 11Laboru. d0 lla<l v1orkcd for 
~rso Stubbs before Deco 7, l962o 
A.tl intention on the par·t of Dennis to de-
iraud or deceive anyone f_i_nds no support in 
' . 
the r2COl'd. No one with enou.c;h r.1cntal capacity 
to be able to formulate an intent to defraud 
\'/ould select the rw~ans used by Dennis o He knew 
that the signature on the l.':tc ~ of the chc ck Mrs o 
Billie Stubbs, did not resumblc her real siena-
tur·~. He knew that if the Vlalk.)r Dank paid the 
check because they failed to observe the fact 
the sit:;:1a turo was not genuin·.], that f!Irs. -Stubbs 
·.·:ould notice it t'lfas not her :.Jignaturc ... ,;~ ~n 
sh0 looked at her ban~ balance and returned 
c:~cckso He did not attempt to conc;)al in any 
mann.;r i1is identity as th~ p ~rson v1ho re cci ved 
t~1e money frol:'l. Curl2y's 1·1art~-:t.. th3 hat.! been 
ther2 0::1 orevious occasions and 1:10.~) knovJri to 
..... -
"c.he son of t~e Manager. ~Ie e;ave his arLlr8 ss 
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and t~l-;phone nu.rnb3r. He did not lau.v'.~ town. 
SoQotime between Dec. 7 and Febo 13 the 
attitude of Lr~::>. Billie Stubbs tov1ard James B • 
•• 
Dennis changed. When the check was cleared 
through iL•r bank and paid on De9o 11, 1962, 
sha presuraably was "~;Tilling to regard him as 
•:.'r :)nployc:;-debtor. She did not return his 
c>. :ck to her bank in January, 1963, but con-
tinued to treat the transaction as an advance 
of wages or a loan to be repaid with laboro 
But on Febo 13, 1963, she signed a criminal 
cu·~,plaint after thrGatening to do so if he 
JiJ not pay her before that date. It did not 
occur to h::;r that she had been defrauded by 
3. crj_r.:inal acto Her actions are consistent 
only uith the obvious fact that Dennis either 
kn2w or had reason to believe when he cashed 
the check that she.would ratify his act in 
t!1us dratving ~:?5.4o31 as an advance of wageso 
It is respectfully submitted that all 
the State proved or that a Jury could find 
b2yo~d a reasonable doubt, was that the Defend-
ant obtained money by an unauthorized signature,· 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
w}~ich was later ratified ;Jy the person whose 
name was si~:.,tl~d and that at the tir;12 the name 
was signed, the Defendant w~o endorsed and cash-
ed the check, intended to pay the check in full 
to his employer. 
The fact that the check was paid and the 
payment by the Bank not objected to by the per-
son whose name was signed without authority, 
would not r,.;quire reversal of the case if there 
was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Dennis 
intended at the time he cashed the check, that 
h·~ ·.-1C11ld not pay it. But the fact that no objec-
tion was made to the unauthorized signature it-
sJli' and t~12 coniplaint was signed because the 
money \"'as not paid to Ivlrso Stubbs, raises a 
strong presumption lthat Dennis ·did reasonably 
believe that llrs o Stubbs vJould ratify his sig-
nature and becor1~e his creditor for :~j54ol3. 
~e do not ask this Court to approve the 
business methods of the Defe~dant, but we 
earnestly submit that the record fails to sus-
tain a finding that the D8fendant intended to 
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dl: r_'ra:ld a:l~'On3 0 It is only incidental proof' 
oi this failure of proof, that he did not in 
fact defrav.d anyone. u:: .:n I-Irs o Stubbs rati-
•• 
:.i3d the clearing of the che.ck, she became 
\iilletts Vo Scudder 11:-lr Po 87 (Ore 1914) 
was a case ivh-:Jre th'J plaintiff sued the defend-
ant l'or libel and recovered a judgment \vhich 
was affirmed on appaalo The defendant had 
written a letter accusing the plaintiff of 
fo1'L_;r~r· The plaintiff had a check payable 
to Scudder Syrup Coo which he r~ceived from 
Allen & Lewis in payment of a debt due the 
Syrup Company. On Novo 20, 1911, Willetts 
wrote to Scudder Co. asking it for permis-sion 
to use the mon~y covered by the check as an 
aJvance on his salary for January and February 
· 1912. Before he received an answer to his re-
quest, he endorsed the check in blank by 
i·rritin[ on the back "Scudder Syrup Coo, A.L. 
~illetts, and deposited it to his credit in 
his bank. The Court said : 
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"It appear:J .CnJJ·! the evidence 
that the plaintiff indorsed the check 
before he received letters from the 
company or the d·2f2ndant telling him 
that it \vas sati:3factory for him to 
havJ th2 r1'0:L:y as he had requestedo 
'i,~le check, after its indorsement, was 
placJd to tl1·~ plaintiff's credit at 
Ladd & Tilton's bank, where he did his 
banking business. He wrote the company's 
name on the back of the chec~ in his 
ordinary handwriting, without any dis-
guise, and wrote his own name below it 
in the same hapdwriting. In his evidence 
he says that he indorsed the check as 
agent of the company, and he appears 
to hav2 thought that, by writing the 
cor1pany' s name and his name irrunediate-
ly below it on the back of the check, 
he indorsed the check as agent of the 
coLpany. Vlhen the plaintiff was testify-
i!lf:':, after he had told of the indorsing 
of the check and depositing it in the 
1 bank, and asking the company for leave 
1
1 
to use the money, a juror asked him \:, .. 
whether he always did it that way, and 
he answered: 'I have done that in at 
least one other instance, and it was 
satisfactory.' This statement was not 
denied by any-evidence. That state-
ment seems to mean that he had in at· 
least one other instance indorsed and 
applied a check of the company in the 
same way that he did in this instance, 
and that his acts in doing so were 
satisfac;toryo This is a circumstance 
t~~Jing, to some extent, to show that 
the company had previously permitted 
l:in to indorse a che cko 
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OnJ of tiL:; mat;rial facts n:;c2ssary 
to constitute the crime of forg3ry 
is an intent to d·Jfraudo If t~1'3 plain-
tiff, when h;:; indqrsed t:1e check, act-
ed in good faith and believed that he 
l:ad a richt, as agent of the company, 
to i~iors2 it, and did not intend to~ 
defraud any qne, he did not commit 
the crin8 of forberyo The signing of 
another's name to a note or a check 
without authority is not riecessarily 
forgery. It constitutes that offense 
only when it is done with intent to 
defraud." 
In l·icCay v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 22 S.Wo 975, 
the Court says in part: 
"It is not every signing of 
another's name without authority 
which constitutes forgery. There 
must inhere in the act an intent to 
injura or defraudo If there is a 
reasonable and honest belief that 
the signature will be approved, 
there can be no forgery.n 
The burden of proving forgery beyon~ a 
reasonable doubt rests on the State and re-
quires proof to establish the falsity of the 
signature and that the purported signers 
nama was signed without his authority. State 
v. Jones 20 P. 2d 614 - 81 Uo 503; State Vo 
Gorham 48 P. 2d 447 - 87 Uo 86. 
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v!:1.ile the record in the Dennis case does 
show testimony that the signature of the maker 
was not authorized, the evidence that the sig-
nature was ratified by i':lrs. Stubbs is so con-
vi:lCi't~~ and incontradicted that the verdict 
of the Jury holding defandant guilty, is not 
sustained by the recordo The fact that the 
ch~ck was paid by 'the Bank and no complaint 
made by Mrso Stubbs until February 13, 1963, 
imposed on the State the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the signature 
was not ratified by Mrso Stubbso The fact 
of ratification destroys the conclusion of 
intention to defraudo 
Upon this point, it is important to note 
that it is not necessary to p~ove that Dennis 
had a prior agr:;ement that Nrso Stubbs would 
ratify l1is act in cashing the checko It is 
sufficient ·to require r·eversal if the record 
does not sustain the vardict of the Jury 
that De~~is intended to defraud Curley's 
~arket {Fonzo Black). 
I 
I: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In State vs. Tavlor (Utah 1963) 378 P. 2d 
~, this Court held and said: 
"In a.criminal proceeding it is 
not sufricient to show merely that 
the accus0d has been dishonest, or 
that he is a cheater, or otherwise of 
bad charactero He is e;ntitled to be 
charged with a specific crima so that 
he may know the 'nature and cause of 
the accusation against him.' And the 
State must prove substantially as 
charged the offense it rel~es u~on 
for convictiono 11 
In the Taylor case, the defendant had cheated 
various business houses from whom he had 
bought meat scrapso He was charged with em-
bezzling ~?50o00 from Utah By-Products Coo 
The conv·i ction was reversed o 
POINT TWO 
The Trial Court committed prejudicial 
error in not declaring a·mistrial on its own 
~tion upon the opening statement of counsel 
for the defendant. 
In his opening stat8ment, the defendant's 
attorney told the Jury that ~!Irso Stubbs, whose 
nam3 appears on the c~1ack as the drawer, would 
be called to testify that it 1.1as not her signa-
14. 
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tur~: and that she didn't authorize the p2rson 
who put it on the check to do so, and that she 
wtll testify that she did not believe the defend-
ant did it either. The defendant will be call-
ed to. testify and he will adnit that he dido 
He signed a confession that· he did, but he did-
n't. He didn't put that name on that check; 
he didn't forge it, and I want you to watch 
him very carefully when he testifies and said 
that he dido 
Now the prosecution will ask the defend-
ant if he has ever been convicted of a felony, 
and this is a felony and he will answer "Yes / 
I 
t~1at he had". The prosecution \'Till ask him / 
that question to show that his testimony is 
umtorthy of belief; that you can't believe 
hir: as to whether or not he is testifying to 
th3 truth because he has already conmitted a 
serious crim2, and under our law the Court 
.. will instruct you that you can disregard his 
15. 
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testify if you don't believe he is telling 
the truth, because he has been convictad of a 
felony once, and this casts a cloud upon his 
ability to tell the truth. ~c ~~ 
The defsndant didn't hire me to represent 
him to plead not ruiltyo Ths defendant doesn't 
want this tric:l; he wanted to plead guilty to 
this charge. He has already admitted to the 
police that he is guilty to this charge 9 and 
h~~ is going to tell you that he is guilty. 
But he is not guilty o And I want you to watch 
hin when he testifies, because ·he didn't do 
it. He did:1't forge that check. 
It is unnecessary and it is unfair to 
counsel for defendant in the Trial Court for 
this Court to speculate upon \vhat motiv~s 
and r-:;asons impelled counsel to make such an 
op2:1i:1f; statement. The damage resulting from 
t~2 opening statement is further compounded by 
.• the fact t~at the Assistant District Attorney, 
after Dennis had testified that he signed the 
:'la!!:e Ers o Billie Stubbs to. the check -'-:.·1i thout 
I 
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authority, and when there was no basis or 
reason H~1atever for the admission of any 
testimony relat:int~ to other crimes, asked 
the de.L·-~ndant 
"Qo Have you ever been convicted of 
a felony Mr. Dennis? 
A. Yes 
Q. What \'las that felony? 
A. Carnal knowledge. 
Q. When was that conviction? 
Hro Nixon: i/Je object to that questiono 
He has asked him the questiono 
The Court: The objection is sustained. 
It is difficult to understand what purpose the 
Assistant District Attorney had in mind which 
could serve the ends of justice in aski~g such 
a questiono Not only ~hact' Dennis testified 
that he wrote the name of Mrs<:' Stubbs on the 
face of t1l3 check i·.Ji thout authority, but the 
attorney for ~1ro Dennis in tre opening state-
ment had told the Jury that Dennis was being 
required to stand trial against his own wishes 
because he \·;anted to plead guilty to the charge 
of forg2 -::=.r. 
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The District .L'.ttorney had no occasion to 
·m -:.ac'l D-~nnl· s or prove that he was not l• p;,.. . -
tellinr the trtith, because he had been con-
victed of a prior felonyo His only purpose· 
could ·have been to hav:; prejudiced and black-
cned the character of Dennis in the minds of 
the Jurors. 
It is difficult to understand wny the 
learned Trial Judge did not recognize that 
after the op2ning statement of the attorney 
for defendant, and the introduction of the 
testimony r·2 tarding carnal kno\vledge, it was 
impossible for the defendant to have received 
a fair trialo It is a mockery of the admin-
istration of justice for a Court to permit 
a defendant to proceed to trial before a Jury 
upon a felony charge of forgery, after his 
attorney in his opening statement had said 
that t~e defendant wanted to plead guilty 
and the defendant has testified 1vithout a!1f 
reason H~1at2ver, so far as an orderly trial 
is concerned, that he had been convict~d of 
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1 1 W] ed ("'":) Such ;nformatl' O'l m1· r:.)·>t hav2 arna .~T!O •• c..."' • • - c • 
e3n useful to the Trial Court upon sentenc8 of 
he defendant. T:1·~ Trial Court should have 
,ccepted a plea of guilty, or ta1:-:;n the trouble 
lt that stage of the proceoding, to fiad out 
~e reasons which impelled counsel for defend-
ant to be placed in the stranga position demon-
strated by this record. He tells the. Jury that 
~h~ defendant \'I ants to plead guilty to forgery, 
but h~) is not guilty and his testimony that he 
is guilty cannot be believed becaus2 he has 
bclen convicted of carnal knowledge o 
w~ are told that it is the function of the 
~ourts and the District Attorneys not merely to 
)btain convictions but to see that all persons 
)~for~ th·J Court receive justice. The proceed-
., 
l!1[.S should have been stopped w~l8n the opening 
:;tatements 1·1ere completed and the· defendant 
~it::2r allo\V"ed to cl:.an.ge his plea to guilty and 
~2ly upon thJ discretion and mercy of t~1e Court, 
)r c·t~~,:;r appropria~e proceedings taken 'dhich 
ro~d hava resulted in a fair trial. The effect 
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of th~ opzninr.; BtatGncnt 'lias a Pl:~a of G'-~_il ty 
before the Jury. The prajudicial and ~: :~ropJr 
tc0timony relating to the conviction of carnal 
knowl::.~d[~.J made conviction certain regarc1l8 :3S of 
what the tGstimony showed regarding the merits 
of the cas0. 
In State VSo Sanchez 361 Po 2d 174 this 
Court held: 
n~:~ ~:' ~c: in serious criminal cases, 
under special circumstances, "vvher-::; the 
interests of justice so require, this 
Court may notice palpable and signifi-
cant error even though proper objec-
tions wcr2 not taken at the trial." 
In State VSo Cobo 60 P. 2d 952 90 U. J2, 
·' 
this Court r2versed a conviction of voluntary 
manslaughter and held: 
11 Th at such error V'Tas manifest 
and of necessity resulted to the preju-
dice of the accused and deprived him 
of a fair trial cannot well be doubted. 
Because of such manifest error and 
further because, as already indicated, 
that the judgment of the court below 
must -be r2versed and a new trial grant-
ed upon ot-her grounds, ~·Te deem it our 
dut~r to notice the error and to correct 
it, though no exception was taken there-
to, in order that on a retrial of ti2 
case the same error may not again be cor:!- . 
mittedo 11 
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o~_p_"]ryt")! c ~--
.L !l .:)IJcilA; V So -:c-.~'-~ 1\.' 3i. .t' o 2d 1091 J 8 5 u o 
2i! the Court held: 
"In this case the defendant ad-
mitted that if the act were proved, 
the intent would be sufficiently shown. 
The defendant was not admitting the 
signin~ of the name and then offering 
sor ~ excuse, authority, mistake, or 
defense t,L ;;refor; but was denying and 
did deny the writing entirely. 
We find no basis within the rule 
or any of the exceptions making the 
admission of the other checks alleged 
to be forged admissibleo Each of the 
other two checks offered and received 
in evidence was payable to a different 
payee, cashed at a different time and 
at a different place, and by different 
persons than the check, the forgGry of 
which the defendant was charged witho 
Vie think it was prejudicial error 
to admit in evidence the checkso They 
tended to prove other separate and dis-
tinct offenseso For the reasons stated 
the judgment of the trial cour~ is re-
versed and the cause remanded with di-
rzctions to grant a new trial. ri -
.. , 
In State vs. Stewart 171 Paco 2d 383, 
110 Utah 203, the defendant was convicted of 
driving a vehicle while under the influence 
of liquor and of having previously been con-
victad of the same crime as alleged in the 
informationo The Court held that the allega-
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tions "u .............................. ~ ~- _minali ty were 
not sufficient to raise that issu·~ o The 
only charee properly before the Jury being 
that r8latine to the substantive offenseo 
The prior convictions were incompetent evi-
dence on that charge: 
"Since, in the instant case the 
prior convictions could not properly 
be considered by the jury in deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant of the substantive offense, 
we conclude that it was reversible 
error to permit evidence thereof to 
be presented to the jury in the trial 
of that issueo" 
In State vso Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 
Paco 2d 229, this Court said: 
"Certainly, if counsel knowing 
that a witness should not be compelled 
to answer, regardless of the exercise 
of her p3rsonal privilege, should by 
askin~ a number of questions which im-
plied immorality, fpr the purpose of 
carrying to the ~jury such impression 
and which it was fairly evident did 
carry to the jury such an impression, 
this court might reverse the case with 
censure on counsel whether or not the 
I'Iitness claimed her privilegeon 
Since there was no reason whatever for 
t::.e Assistant District Attorney to affect the 
22o 
I: 
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r~dability of th2 dcf.~ndant, it was ir11proper 
nrl pr·.!judicial to bring to the attJntion of 
he Jury the prior conviction for carnal kno\·rl-
dge. 
Sxa!t!ination of the record in this case by 
tnyone not far:tiliar with any of the facts out-
lide the r\JCOrd, compels the conciusion that 
~e defendant was d2nied a fair trial by an un-
1rJjudiced Jury upon the criwe of forgery with 
rhich he was chargedo Th2ro may have been ext:.;n-
latinL~ circumstanc3s and facts outside the record 
~ich explain, but could not justify or condone 
;he procJ8di:1r~ as it app~ars from the record. 
:f counsel for a defendant feels impelled, by 
·eason of his candor and integrity to make the 
1penin[_; statement before t~1e Jury, which was made 
~ counsel in this case, the Jury should be dis-
:harged and counsel should be relieved of his 
'bligation to his client. 1.!!1il·~ the effect o.f 
·:'le opening stat.2ment was to make it· co1::pl2tely 
·' 
r:possibl2 for the defendant to g2t a fc:.ir and 
cpartial trial, it did not mention to tha Jury 
'i 
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the fact that the check involved was actually 
paid by the Bank on December 11, 1962, and 
that the transaction was treated as a loan 
by ~Irso Billie Stubbs to her employee Dennis 
until February 13, 1963, and that the Jury 
could well have found that Dennis had no in-
tention o.f defrauding his employero The ques-
tion of whether the name· of the maker was sign-
ed by the defendant or someone else becomes 
immaterial in this case, because th·3r2 is no 
dispute f:r:om tha record that tn2 defenda1.1t 
cashed the check at Curley's Market. 
Casual comparison of the name James B. 
Dennis which appears on the face of the check 
as payee, indicates that it is not the sac2 
handwriting as the endorsement of James Bo 
Dennis on the back of the checko The case 
was tried belo\v on the theory that it vias a 
valid defense if the Jury could be convinced 
~that because the defenda~t was a convicted 
felon, h~ could not be believed \AJhen he testi-
fied he signed the check v.Ji thout autnori ty o 
?J. 
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It io not surprising t~at t~e Jury ~2~ not 
convtnc ~d by t::j s th80rJ, becaus'J it must 
h:1vc be3n appar:::nt to the Jury that it taacJe 
littlo diff,..:r\..:nce 'ttJho signed the names in 
q,lestion of IVlrso Stubbs and Mro Dennis on 
the back of the ch~ck if the defendant cash-
ed the el1eck at Curley's Market when he 
obviously ~new the name of ~rrs. Stubbs had 
been signed not by her and without authorityo 
Th~re was still a cogent valid thsory which 
folPld such strong support in the testimony 
that we submit t!d_s Court must hold, as a 
matter of law that the case should not have 
been submitt3d to the Jury; that Dennis did 
not intend to defraud his employer or any-
body elsa. He was charg~d with defrauding 
. ' 
Fonzo Black, but it is undisputed that Black 
received his money from the Bank. As the 
record stands, there is no proof that the 
dafanda~t at the time of trial had not paid 
Nrso Billie Stubbs the ~?54o3l 1·:hich he owed 
to h~ro 
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In a r~c~nt Utah caso, Stat~ vs. Kazda, 
~82 P. 2:1 407, invol'Ii n[~ an erron~ous admis-
sion of evidence of prior felony convictions 
the Court said, "The apparent purpose and r:;a-
son fur p-:;rmitting the prosecution to question 
t;1·~ accused r;;cu.rding prior felony convictions 
is to .:tf.f'~: ct his cr..:~di bili ty as a 'tli tn3 ss on 
I, 
I I 
I. 
The defendant D~nnis in the instant case ! · 
had tastified that he signed the check with-
out authorityo There was no reason for the 
prosecution to affect hjs credibility as a 
1:itness o 
Tlt~..: Kazda case follo~.-Js State vs o Dick-
~~'-2~, __ _12 Uto 2d 8, 361 Po 2d 4i2o The Court 
rev2rsed a conviction of robbery because evi-
dence of other crimes was improperly admitted. 
T!1:.; Court said: 
· "The universally accepted general 
rule is that such evide::;,ce is not adr~is­
sa':l~ if -"_ ts effect is merelv to dis-
grace th~ def2ndant or show his oronen-
"t ~ ~ SJ. y to COI::T!li t crir~e on 
I 
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No rcasonaolc J111.'y co-tld possibly find, 
bJyond a r8asonable dbubt, that the defendant 
could hav·:J int(~nded to defraud his employ~r, 
in v.i •.;\1 of t:;e complete absence of any decep-
t.!.on used l)y himo He intended to become her 
debtllr for :..;54o31 and she concurred in his in-
tention by her action frou December 11, 1962 
wh-~n the check was paid presumably with her 
knowledge and approval and sometime in Febo 
1963 when she told Mro Dennis that if he did-
n't make the check good she would have to 
swear Otlt a complainto 
In conclusion, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the judgment and conviction of 
the Trial Court should be reversed •. 
. , Respectfully submitted, 
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